In 2011, Netflix announced changes that observers characterized as among the greatest missteps in the history of corporate strategy. First, the company significantly raised prices. Then, Reed Hastings, the founder and CEO of Netflix, described plans to split the company between streaming and disc rental, spinning off the DVD-rental business to a new entity called Qwikster. The outrage from customers and investors was extreme. Within two weeks, Hastings reversed the plan to split the company (though maintaining the price increases). During the debacle, Netflix lost 2 million subscribers and the stock dropped more than 75 percent in value.
netflix and qwikster
Hastings saw online streaming as providing Netflix subscribers with access to content without the wait and the expense of sending a physical object through the mail. Netflix had begun its "over-the-top" streaming service in 2007, sending its videos over customers' existing internet connections. The company launched its service with roughly 1,000 films available to subscribers after a one-time download of a Netflix app onto a Windows computer with high-speed internet access.
Netflix integrated its streaming listings into its DVD rental service. If a DVD in a subscriber's queue was also available online, it would be highlighted with a WATCH NOW button. The streaming content was available under Netflix monthly subscription fees, with no advertising. Netflix had initially limited video streaming time based on DVD rental subscription plans -one hour of monthly streaming video for every dollar of monthly subscription fees. In 2008, Netflix began offering unlimited access, and LG electronics announced a new set-top box connector, the beginning of access to the television set.
Netflix said it spent more than $40 million in 2007 to create its online service, with a major portion of the expense going to securing rights to video content. Although some studios were not willing to offer their products, Netflix had been able to negotiate arrangements with NBC Universal, Sony Pictures, MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Inc., 20th Century Fox, Paramount Pictures, Warner Bros., Lionsgate, New Line Cinema, and a number of television studios. In 2008 Hastings announced a major coup as Netflix negotiated a fixed-price partnership with Starz, which brought 25,000 movies and TV shows to Netflix's streaming service, including Disney and Sony films.
By 2008, several other companies were beginning to stream movies online, including Starz Entertainment's Vongo and the studio-owned MovieBeam, MovieLink and CinemaNow services. 9 Apple offered movies through iTunes while Disney joined with NBCUniversal, News Corporation, and others to create Hulu to provide television content on computers. Hulu was free to users, with advertising support.
Even with many other options available, Netflix streaming continued to grow. By October 2010, Hastings noted:
We are very proud to announce that by every measure we are now a streaming company, which also offers DVD-by-mail. In Q4, we'll spend more on streaming content than DVD content, and we'll deliver many more hours of entertainment via streaming than on DVD. More impressively, a majority of our subscribers will watch more content streamed from Netflix than delivered by us on DVD. DVD-by-mail shipments are still growing, but streaming for us is much larger and growing much faster. 10 At the beginning of 2011, Netflix had 28,000 titles available in streaming, 4,315 of them available in HD. At the same time, its DVD catalog counted 102,000 titles. In terms of streaming movies provided, Netflix moved past iTunes in streaming movies over the internet. One industry survey showed that Netflix was the source of 20 percent of all data flowing over the internet during prime time. 11 (See Exhibit 2 for Nielsen Data for various aspects of usage of online video in the U.S.)
In addition to providing customers with immediate access to content and avoiding postage charges, the streaming business allowed Netflix to expand internationally (its disc rental business had been optimized to fit the requirements of the U.S. postal system). The company began offering streaming services in Canada in September 2010 and was planning to enter South America and the Caribbean in July 2011. Despite the market rise, there were questions about the valuation. For example, one investor, Whitney Tilson, wrote in December 2010 that his fund had shorted Netflix stock since mid-year and continued to do so, even though that strategy had led to significant losses. He described his assessment that Netflix was caught in a fundamental market shift:
We think the valuation is extreme and that the rapid shift of its customers to streaming content (vs. mailing DVDs to customers) isn't the beginning of an exciting, highly-profitable new world for Netflix, but rather the beginning of the end of its incredible run. In particular, we think margins will be severely compressed and growth will slow over the next year. 13 Naysayers like Tilson believed that Netflix might still have its brand name and customer base, but as customers shifted to online content delivery it would face many threats to its margin. Netflix would be up against "some of the largest, most powerful, aggressive and deep-pocketed companies in the world." 14 In response, Reed Hastings' acknowledged that Netflix faced risks, but argued that the company was well positioned. Netflix faced capital expenditures as it expanded into international markets, but the potential for growth justified the investment. He acknowledged that the company would face increased costs for content, but it could hold its margin by reducing content choices if necessary. He remained optimistic about the industry and Netflix's position:
Streaming is growing rapidly; it is propelling Hulu, YouTube, Netflix, and others to huge growth rates. Streaming adoption will likely follow the classic S curve, and we're still on the first part (acceleration) of the S curve.
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The Short Unhappy Life of Qwikster
But in mid-2011, everything changed.
The problems began on July 12 when Jessie Becker, Netflix's VP of Marketing, announced that the company was restructuring its pricing. Streaming would no longer be a free, unlimited add-on to subscriptions for DVD rental, but each service would require separate monthly charges. Customers who wanted to continue both mail rental of DVDs and internet streaming would need to subscribe to both plans. For some subscribers, this meant an increase in their monthly charges of 60 percent. Before the price increase, a customer could get one DVD at a time, unlimited service for $9.99 a month, with internet streaming at no extra charge. After September 1, 2011, the same service would cost $15.98. Customers who selected DVD rental only or online streaming only would pay $7.99, but there was no discount for combined service. 16 Customers expressed their outrage in online comments and blogs, with nearly 13,000 comments directed to Netflix's blog. Many canceled their subscriptions. Within a few days the stock began to slide, losing a third of its value in eight weeks.
Then on September 18, Netflix made a second change. Hastings announced that the company was spinning out the DVD rental service, completely separating DVD rental from streaming. It would keep sending DVDs by mail under a new name, Qwikster.com. Andy Rendich, former head of DVD rental at Netflix, would lead Qwikster. The Netflix name would be applied only to the newly independent streaming service. Customers seeking access to both DVD rentals and online streaming would have to maintain two accounts, with separate bills, separate queues, and separate recommendation lists.
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In addition to the blog posting, Netflix provided a short welcome video on YouTube featuring Hastings and Rendich sitting on a patio of the Netflix offices in Los Gatos, California. In both the video and the Netflix blog, Hastings apologized for the tone (but not the content) of the July price announcement. The blog entry began: I messed up. I owe everyone an explanation…It is clear from the feedback over the past two months that many members felt we lacked respect and humility in the way we announced the separation of DVD and streaming, and the price changes. That was certainly not our intent, and I offer my sincere apology. I'll try to explain how this happened.
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Hastings blamed the earlier uproar as a failure of communication. He explained that the price and service changes were necessary to help transition the company into streaming. Hastings argued that once customers understood the strategy, they would understand why the changes were necessary.
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The response to these announcements was immediate. Pundits ridiculed the Qwikster idea and logo. More than two million customers canceled their service. The announcement video became an object of ridicule and was even parodied by Saturday Night Live. 20 DVDs will be staying at netflix.com. It is clear that for many of our members two websites would make things more difficult, so we are going to keep Netflix as one place to go for streaming and DVDs.
This means no change: one website, one account, one password… in other words, no Qwikster.
While the July price change was necessary, we are now done with price changes… We value our members, and we are committed to making Netflix the best place to get movies & TV shows.
Thank you.
-Reed
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A few observers praised him for being willing to abandon a bad idea, while most were simply bewildered. As one investor noted:
It is astonishing that a company that had done everything right for so long suddenly lost its way. There wasn't a change in leadership or any other perceptible cause that I could find. In light of the absence of a reasonable explanation I decided to consider the unreasonable and inexplicable: temporary insanity, alien abduction, conspiracy.
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Hastings described the missteps as a question of timing rather than strategy. In the announcement of the birth of Qwikster, Hastings had written, "Companies rarely die from moving too fast, and they frequently die from moving too slowly." In discussing the reversal, Hastings later said, "there is a difference between moving quickly -which Netflix has done very well for years -and moving too fast, which is what we did in this case." 
Staying Afloat in the Streaming World
After the Qwikster debacle, investors seemed to awaken to Netflix's precarious position in an increasingly crowded world of streaming content providers. Growing broadband access and rising consumer taste for video-on-demand had induced the entry of numerous players. Content developers were looking for ways to provide their material directly to customers as well as providing licenses to multiple content aggregators, including cable networks and other streaming sources. Cable providers, television networks, and premium movie channels like HBO were all developing their own streaming and on-demand services, particularly to reach mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets. Meanwhile, technology companies and telephone companies were readying their own offerings. By 2012, providers of streaming videos included:
Technology companies:
Retailers:  Amazon.com (Amazon Video on Demand available through Amazon Prime);  Walmart (Vudu). Not only did these companies provide direct competition to Netflix for subscribers, many of the companies also provided crucial services that Netflix needed to stream video content to its subscribers. Particularly in the areas of securing and distributing content, Netflix often found itself relying on these alternative providers to license its content and reach its customers.
Securing Content
In 2012, Netflix's inventory of titles for streaming remained smaller than its inventory of through-themail DVD titles. Nonetheless, the company announced that its streaming reached a billion hours per month, roughly 38 hours per streaming subscriber. Interestingly, Netflix's streaming customers increasingly were watching television shows rather than feature films.
Streaming avoided the costs of mailing and handling DVD discs, but usage charges were much higher. Unlike a DVD, which Netflix was free to rent out over and over once it purchased the disc, streaming required specific licensing, and fee structures varied dramatically. Some content owners charged Netflix a fee each time a video was watched, while others opted for a one-time charge per title. According to one industry observer, licensing costs could be as low as a few cents per play for older content and as high as $4.00 per play for recent movies. 25 (See Exhibit 5 for Netflix's description of its contractual obligations for streaming content, both on and off the books, and some public reporting of contracts and terms. See Exhibit 6 for a comparison of the contribution to margin from Netflix's streaming and DVD services.)
For content providers, revenue from streaming sources was an important and growing source of earnings. Licensing fees from streaming providers, like syndication charges, went directly to the developer's bottom line, since costs for movies or TV shows had already been spent. Besides increasing licensing fees, content developers were restricting access to popular offerings. Many television show developers gave licenses to stream past seasons, but retained the current season for their own distribution channels.
In the early days of streaming, Netflix was able to negotiate attractive rates from content providers. But even these deals contained restrictions. Under the Netflix 2008 contract with Starz, Sony had required a cap on the number of streaming subscribers. When Netflix's subscriber numbers reached that cap in June 2011, Sony's movies disappeared from the "Watch Now" catalog.
Many of the early contracts, including the Starz arrangement, expired in 2012 or soon thereafter. Analysts expected the studios to raise prices to Netflix and other streaming providers. One analyst predicted Netflix's streaming content licensing costs under the new contracts could rise as much as tenfold, from $180 million in 2010 to a whopping $1.98 billion in 2012. As a first portent, in September 2011 negotiations for a new contract with Starz collapsed, with Starz pulling its movies and TV shows from Netflix the following February. The Los Angeles Times reported that Starz had rejected a Netflix offer of more than $300 million per year, holding out for a premium tier with an additional fee for subscribers to see Starz content. In June 2012, Disney failed to reach terms with streaming and rental providers, leaving Netflix to buy DVDs of Disney movies at retail and entirely curtail streaming any Disney movies.
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As content providers restricted access and raised prices, Netflix decided to get into content production itself, by bankrolling a number of original series through guaranteed licensing fees. The first, Lilyhammer, told the story of a former American Mafia member who lived in the Norwegian city of Lillehammer when he entered the witness protection program. In early 2012 the series played first in Norway and then was available on Netflix streaming (but not through Netflix's DVD rental). All eight episodes of the first season were released at once, avoiding the typical one-show-a-week airing described by Netflix as "linear programming." Netflix considered the show a success and planned a second season (although filming was delayed while the star, Steven Van Zandt, was on tour with Bruce Springsteen and the E Street Band). In its investor letter, Netflix set a standard of success for these original ventures, based on comparable purchased rights: "If Lilyhammer or House of Cards is popular enough on Netflix so that the fees we've paid for each are in-line with that of other equally-popular content on Netflix during the same time period, we'll consider them a success."
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Netflix also explored other ways of differentiating its content. In July 2011, the company created a "Just for Kids" catalog of streaming films and television programs suitable for children. The feature was made available over the Wii game system.
Distributing Content
Many subscribers were streaming videos to their computers or mobile devices, but Hastings knew he had to make it as easy for users to watch on their televisions as popping a DVD into a player. He negotiated Netflix-ready technology on connection devices such as Apple TV and Roku, and game console players such as the PS3, Xbox360, and the Wii. New Blu-Ray DVD players could transmit the Netflix stream to the television and even sported a Netflix button on the remote control. Some new HDTVs came "Netflix ready."
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But getting streaming content to home devices required considerable investment. Quality and bandwidth for delivering the signal were major issues for all streaming services. Streaming services did not yet provide the high-definition quality that customers received from their cable or satellite services, given the level of compression necessary to move content over the internet and particularly over "the last mile," the internet provider's connection into the consumer's household. Netflix had to find ways to reduce the amount of re-buffering, accelerate start-up, and deliver higher quality streams, with minimal signal breakup or interruptions.
Signal quality was in part a function of the bandwidth available to customers, and in part a function of the distance and number of connection points that the signal had to travel to get to the customer. To minimize the distance traveled and improve video quality, Netflix first contracted with a content delivery network (CDN) called Akamai, which had installed server boxes at internet service provider (ISP) locations at the "end of the internet." The Akamai system of over 100,000 service boxes in 75 countries put it "a single network hop away from 90% of internet users."
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While initially purchasing services from Akamai and others, in the summer of 2012 Netflix began to disperse its internal capabilities to deliver video. Netflix set up servers in London, England, and six U.S. locations: Ashburn Virginia, Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Jose. In addition to these regional hubs, it offered to install free "appliances" to local ISPs, recommending a cluster of Netflix Open Connect boxes for any metro network serving populations of 100,000 or more broadband subscribers, recommending one box for every 5 Gigabits per second of Netflix traffic. The local ISP had to provide only the space for the box, power, and one system port for the cable from each Open Connect box. Each Netflix box held 100 terabytes of data, enough to store 70 to 90 percent of the titles that customers would seek to stream. Netflix's algorithms updated the local boxes daily, refreshing the content using slower speeds during off-peak times, usually changing around 5 percent of the content daily to reflect national usage patterns. More obscure requests would still have to move over the internet, but the majority of the subscriber demand could be met by the local box.
Moving Netflix's movies storage closer to the customer would make the quality more reliable. Moreover, by making streaming content available locally, Netflix and the ISP could stream video for a much lower cost. Local service was essentially free for ISPs, but there were hefty congestion charges for moving content over the internet, particularly at peak times. By 2012 Netflix streaming had grown to 30 percent of US peak-time usage, and it expected to cut the streaming costs of a full-length movie from a nickel down to two-and-a-half cents.
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But even with this substantial investment in infrastructure, Netflix's access could be threatened if internet providers began to limit bandwidth or show preferences for their own channels.
For example, Comcast, a major cable provider that had merged with NBCUniversal in early 2011, had engaged the ire of Reed Hastings and Netflix. Part of the government approval for the ComcastNBCUniversal merger required Comcast as an internet provider to maintain "net neutrality," treating all internet traffic equally. Net neutrality would in theory give over-the-top providers such as Netflix equal access to Comcast customers' internet bandwidth. However, in spring 2012 Netflix complained that its streaming subscribers were being subjected to Comcast's customers' monthly data caps of 250 Gigabytes, while Comcast's Xfinity.tv streaming service for its own customers was not counted against the usage cap. For its part, Comcast argued that Xfinity.tv was actually part of its cable offerings and therefore appropriately not counted against the cap.
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Exploring another direction for improving picture quality and avoiding internet signal breakup, Hastings was reportedly in talks with cable networks (other than Comcast) to consider offering Netflix as a Videoon-Demand cable channel, directly competing with premium channels like HBO and Showtime.
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The Promise and Perils of the Streaming World
A Consumer Reports September 2012 survey of its readers suggested the promise and perils of the new streaming world for Netflix. As Hastings might have predicted, the survey revealed that twice as many Netflix customers had opted for streaming service as for DVD rental. The preference among Netflix subscribers was mirrored by Consumer Reports readers generally; more than half of over 15,000 subscribers had used a streaming video service within the previous month, more than the number that reported seeing a movie in theaters, on disc, or on cable video on demand channels.
The good news for Hastings was that of those who had used a streaming service, 81 percent had used Netflix. The bad news was that customers ranked Netflix in sixth place of the streaming services in terms of satisfaction. The company got high marks for convenience and price, but was down-rated for its limited content selection.
The survey also revealed that Netflix's disc rental service remained the top-rated company for getting content on physical discs. 35 The difference in Netflix's standing in the survey outlined the dilemma facing Hastings. On one hand, he had the top-rated company in the declining market for DVD rentals. On the other hand, Netflix was struggling to find its niche in the rapidly expanding market for online streaming. In 2011, Hastings had believed the answer to this problem was to split the two businesses and invest heavily in the expanding market. When this organizational solution to the problem was widely rejected by customers and investors, Hastings nonetheless kept investing in Netflix's streaming side of the business. But would this be enough? The competition in the online streaming marketplace was fierce and many of Netflix's competitors held important assets that could prevent the company's ability to expand its streaming services.
This case has been developed for pedagogical purposes. The case is not intended to furnish primary data, serve as an endorsement of the organization in question, or illustrate either effective or ineffective management techniques or strategies. See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements.
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